

SOME COMMENTS ON REFLEXIVIZATION IN ICELANDIC*

0. INTRODUCTION

In this paper I will make some comments on Anderson's and Maling's papers in this volume on reflexivization in Icelandic. I will show how that Anderson's theory makes some predictions which are not borne out by the facts, while Maling's notion of predication often makes it difficult to see what the predictions of her theory actually are. Occasionally, I will hint at other explanations, but these comments do not present any coherent theory of Icelandic reflexivization.

Informants' judgments on reflexivization differ very widely — much more widely than I thought previous to writing these comments. From reading Maling's paper, one could think that there are essentially two dialects; speakers of one accept object-controlled reflexivization, whereas speakers of the other don't. Anderson, on the other hand, does not mention any dialectal differences, and claims (as does Thráinsson (1976 and 1979)) that object-controlled reflexivization is optional. But the situation is in fact much more complex than any of these papers would indicate, since judgments differ so much: not only do speakers differ, but the same speaker's judgments can differ from one day to another. I am thus quite sure that many speakers of Icelandic would not agree on all the grammaticality judgments presented here, so I have tried to use more than one type of examples in arguing for or against any particular claim, and I hope that although some speakers of Icelandic may disagree with me in some cases, enough evidence will be left to support my conclusion.

1. NON-CLAUSE-BOUNDED REFLEXIVIZATION

Let us first turn to the main topic of Anderson's paper (this volume): NON-CLAUSE-BOUNDED REFLEXIVIZATION (NCBR). Thráinsson (1976) was the first to draw attention to this phenomenon in Icelandic, and he pointed out that although NCBR correlates with a certain use of the subjunctive, "subjunctive as such doesn't 'govern' Reflexive — or to put it differently: it is not a sufficient condition for the application of the NCBR that we have a subjunctive form of the verb in the lower clause" (Thráinsson 1976, p. 230). Thráinsson's conclusion is that "It doesn't seem possible to find a

syntactic explanation for the distribution of NCBR" (1976, p. 237), and that it must be analyzed as being semantic in nature.

Maling (1982, 1984) has essentially accepted Thráinsson's conclusion on the semantic nature of NCBR, although she argues that "The conditions on the choice of possible antecedents for NCBR seem to reflect the conflict between a semantic and a syntactic characterization of the phenomenon" (Maling 1984). She relates the use of NCBR to some West African languages' use of 'logophoric' pronouns, which "are an indirect speech phenomenon associated with verbs reflecting an individual's point of view, thought or feelings . . ." (Maling 1984).

Anderson, on the other hand, seeks a purely syntactic explanation. He tries to explain the different possibilities of NCBR in indicative subordinate clauses (where it is impossible) and subjunctive subordinate clauses (where it is optional) by relating it to TENSE. A subordinate clause in the indicative mood can have a different tense from its main clause, so that tense must be base generated in both the main and the subordinate clauses. But on the other hand, Anderson claims, a subordinate clause in the subjunctive mood must have the same tense as the main clause. Therefore, Anderson claims, we do not have to base generate tense in the subordinate clause, because we can copy it from the main clause by a rule of Tense-agreement. When tense is not base generated in the subordinate clause, the anaphoric domain in question will make up both the main and the subordinate clauses, and thus NCBR can (and must) apply. The option of having a personal pronoun in a subjunctive clause instead of NCBR is explained by the fact that all rules are optional; hence, tense can be base generated in subjunctive clauses, too; and if so, NCBR cannot apply.

By and large, this theory appears to work, I think; and in fact I find it in many ways quite appealing. It may be pointed out that although reflexivization was much more common within a clause in Old Icelandic than it is now (reflexives very often had objects of verbs, and sometimes even objects of prepositions, as antecedents), NCBR was very rare — much more rare than in Modern Icelandic (see Nygaard 1905, p. 343) — and some authors have even doubted that NCBR occurred at all in Old Icelandic (Juntune 1978, p. 422). And, interestingly enough, the connection between the tense of a main clause and the tense of a subordinate clause, even in the subjunctive mood, appears to have been much looser in Old Icelandic than it is now; it is easy to find sentences with a different tense in a subjunctive subordinate clause than in the main clause (see Nygaard 1905, pp. 273–275, 331–332). This correlation is, of course, exactly what we would expect if Anderson's theory were correct; we could then say that tense was more often (or always) base generated in Old Icelandic, and hence the conditions for NCBR were (almost) never met.

However, many sorts of counterexamples to Anderson's theory can be found. Maling (1984) mentions one: it is possible to have a reflexive referring to the subject of the main clause and also a personal pronoun

referring to (another) superordinate subject in the same (subjunctive) clause. This is illustrated in (1):

- (1) Jón_i taldi að María_j hefði sagt að ég
 believed that had SUBJ said that I
 hefði skilað henni_j bókunum sínum_i.
 had SUBJ returned her_j books REFL_i
 John believed that Mary had said that I had returned his books
 to her.

Under Anderson's theory, the reflexive would demand that the tense of the subordinate clause be copied from the main clause, but the non-reflexive would demand that tense be base-generated in the subordinate clause — and that is a paradox which cannot be avoided.

Another counterexample is the following. It is possible to find sentences with NCBR although the tenses of the main and the subordinate clauses are different:

- (2) María_i segir öllum að ég hefði barið
 tells PRES everybody that I had PAST SUBJ hit
 sig_i ef hún hefði ekki farið.
 REFL_i if she had PAST SUBJ not gone
 Mary tells everybody that I would have hit her if she hadn't
 gone.

I cannot see how Anderson's theory would accommodate this. It might possibly be claimed that tense isn't really base-generated in the *that*-clause, because it gets its tense from the *if*-clause. Whether or not this is correct, it is at least clear that the *that*-clause and the *if*-clause must have the same tense. But this does not suffice to explain away the example in (2), because we can also have NCBR in the *if*-clause:

- (3) María_i fullyrðir að ég hefði farið ef ég
 states PRES that I had PAST SUBJ gone if I
 hefði ekki mætt sér
 had PAST SUBJ not met REFL_i
 Mary states that I would have gone if I hadn't met her.

And we can even get NCBR in both the subordinate clauses:

- (4) María_i fullyrðir að ég hefði meitt sig_i
 states PRES that I had PAST SUBJ hurt REFL_i
 ef ég hefði barið sig_j.
 if I had PAST SUBJ hit REFL_i
 Mary states that I would have hurt her if I had hit her.

At least one of the subordinate clauses must have base-generated tense,

so that these sentences must be counted as real counterexamples to Anderson's theory. Note that the matrix subject **María** in (4) is the only possible antecedent of the reflexive in the *if*-clause; i.e., it cannot be dependent on the first **sig**, because NCBR is never object-controlled.

Still another problem for Anderson's theory concerns the possible antecedents of NCBR. Anderson claims that in sentences like (5) (= Anderson's (4a)), the reflexive in the lowest clause can be coreferential with both of the intermediate subjects **María** and **Haraldur**, as well as the main clause subject **Jón** and the lowest subject **Billi**:

- (5) Jón_i segir að María_i viti að Haraldur_k
 says that knows SUBJ that Harold_k
 vilji að Billi_i meiði sig_{ij/k/i}.
 wants SUBJ that hurts SUBJ REFL_{ij/k/i}

John says that Mary knows that Harold wants that Bill hurts him/her/himself.

Maling (1984) quotes a similar example from Thráinsson (1976), and claims the same as Anderson as regards coreference possibilities. But it must be stressed that Thráinsson (1976) never claims that in such sentences the reflexive can be coreferential with all of the subjects. He only claims that as long as no indicative intervenes, NCBR can apply over an indefinite number of subordinate clauses containing subjunctives (1976, p. 225). And although I would not claim it is totally wrong to say that the reflexive can refer to all of the subjects in (5), it is clear that it matters which verbs are in the intermediate clauses. Note, for instance, the difference between (6) and (7):

- (6) ??Ég held að Jón_i viti að þú viljir
 I think that knows SUBJ that you want SUBJ
 hitta sig_i
 to meet REFL_i

I think that John knows that you want to meet him.

- (7) Ég held að Jón_i voni að þú viljir
 I think that hopes SUBJ that you want SUBJ
 hitta sig_i
 to meet REFL_i

I think that John hopes that you want to meet him.

The exact judgments of (6) will vary between speakers, but I think most speakers will agree that it is considerably worse than (7), and some would not accept it at all. This contrast is quite unexpected under Anderson's theory; but it is easy to understand (though perhaps not so easy to explain)

if we look at the lexical (and semantic) properties of the two verbs in question. *Vita* 'know' is of course a factive verb which usually takes the indicative in its complement, but can (optionally) take the subjunctive if it is embedded under a nonfactive verb, due to the "domino effect" (Thráinsson 1976). *Vona* 'hope', on the other hand, is nonfactive and always takes a subjunctive complement. It appears, thus, that although NCBR can apply over a subjunctive produced by the domino effect, it can only marginally refer to the subject of a verb which lexically governs the indicative. But reference to the lexical properties of verbs is incompatible with Anderson's theory.¹

Still more examples can be added to show the inadequacies of Anderson's theory. Maling (1982 and 1984) gives an example of NCBR where the antecedent does not c-command the reflexive:

- (8) *Skoðun* *Siggu*_i *er að* *sig*_i *vanti hæfileika.*
Opinion is that REFL_i lacks talents
 Sigga's opinion is that she lacks talents.

Here, proponents of Anderson's theory have two choices: they must either give up the c-command condition, or make up some plausible structure for (8) where the antecedent in fact does c-command the reflexive. Which possibility is chosen is immaterial here, because we always get the crucial contrast between (8) and (9):

- (9) **Skoðun* *sumra Íslendinga*_i *er að* *sig*_i *vanti hæfileika.*
Opinion some Icelanders_i is that REFL_i lack talents
 Some Icelanders' opinion is that they lack talents.

The reason for this difference seems to be that it has to be possible to interpret the *that*-clause as expressing the opinion or thought of one special person (or perhaps a strictly defined group of people). But 'some Icelanders' is such a loosely defined group that this interpretation is impossible. Yet, the structure is presumably the same in all relevant respects in both examples.²

Summarizing, then, it is clear that although Anderson's theory is appealing at first glance, many cases can be found where it either makes wrong predictions or does not make any predictions at all.³

2. CLAUSE-BOUNDED REFLEXIVIZATION

Let us next look at clause-bounded reflexivization, which is the topic of Maling's paper (this volume). In the beginning, Maling states that "any framework which does not recognize predication relationships cannot hope to account for the differences between various kinds of 'simplex' sentences with respect to reflexivization". Since PREDICATION is the

central point of Maling's explanation, one would like to have a definition of the term in the beginning. Maling does not give one, and although she refers to the 'predicate complex' of Hellan (1982) and the 'clause nucleus' of LFG, the reader does not get a clear picture of Maling's use of the term, especially since "The notion of predication needed for locatives and directionals is not as crystal-clear as one would like", as Maling (this volume, n. 10) acknowledges.

Let me first mention a case where the reflexive is (almost) obligatory, but where predication does not seem to obtain. I have in mind the difference between (10) (= Maling's (1a)) and (11):

- (10) Jón sýndi Haraldi föt á $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ??sig_i. \\ hann_i. \end{array} \right.$
John showed clothes for $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ??REFL_i \\ him_i \end{array} \right.$

John showed Harold clothes for him.

- (11) Forstjórinn svipti Harald_i vinnu $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} sinn_i. \\ ??hans_i. \end{array} \right.$
The manager deprived of job $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} REFL_i \\ ??his_i \end{array} \right.$

The manager deprived Harold of his job.

Maling is right in that many speakers do not accept the reflexive in sentences like (10); but in (11), most speakers seem to prefer the reflexive, and many of them — including some who usually don't accept object-controlled reflexivization — find the reflexive virtually obligatory. Yet, *svipta* is a verb that takes two objects (accusative and dative), just as *sýna* does, although the order of cases is reversed. It is clear that no small clause is involved in (11); the case marking of the two objects is independent, as can be seen in the passive:

- (12) Haraldur_i (NOM) var sviptur vinnu sinni_i (DAT).
was deprived of job REFL_i

Harold was deprived of his job.

I cannot see that predication is any more involved in (11) than in (10). I think that if predication is defined in some way that explains this difference, the definition will become so wide or loose that it will lack any explanatory power. Let me stress that I'm not denying that predication has got something to do with reflexivization possibilities. But it seems clear that some other factors — semantic or syntactic — are involved, too; so maybe predication is only a subset of these factors. But what are these other factors?

One possible factor could be that the cases are of different types. According to Levin and Simpson (1981), verbs like *sýna* would have two thematic objects (the second having "quirky case"); but the dative object of *svipta* in (11) would probably be analyzed as having "semantic case", as can be seen from the fact that it does not passivize:

- (13) *Vinnunni var sviptur Haraldur.
The job was deprived of
Harold was deprived of his job.

But the trouble with this explanation is that the verb *ræna* 'deprive of, rob', which is similar to *svipta* in taking an accusative and a dative object (in that order), and is classified by Levin and Simpson (1981) as having a second object with "semantic case", seems to behave like *sýna* with respect to reflexivization:

- (14) Jón rændi Harald_i dýrustu bókinni { ??sinni_i
 hans.
 John deprived of most expensive book { ??REFL_i
 his_i
 John deprived Harold of his most expensive book.

So referring to different (semantic or syntactic) types of cases does not tell the whole story.

Possibly it matters whether a verb obligatorily takes two objects, or whether the first object is optional. Most verbs taking a dative and an accusative object, in that order (*sýna*, *senda* etc.) and also *ræna*, with the reverse order, can optionally drop the first object; but *svipta* must have two objects:

- (15) a. Jón sýndi fötin (ACC).
showed the clothes
John showed the clothes.
- b. Jón rændi fötunum (DAT).
stole the clothes
John stole the clothes.
- c. *Jón svipti vinnunni (DAT).
deprived of the job
John deprived of the job.
- d. *Jón svipti mig (ACC).
deprived of me
John deprived me.

If we compare Maling's sentences in (6) (with verbs like *berja* 'hit', *tala við* 'talk to', and *skrifa* 'write') to her sentences in (7) (with verbs like *taka* 'take', *leggja* 'lay', and *lyfta* 'lift'), it is remarkable that in (6), where many people find the reflexive impossible, the object is optional; whereas in (7), where all speakers accept reflexives and even prefer them, the object is obligatory. The same goes for the minimal pair in (16) (= Maling's (8)):

- (16) a. Við skiluðum honum_i peningunum $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ?sín_{i,} \\ \text{hans}_{i,} \end{array} \right.$
 we returned him_i the money $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} ?REFL_{i,} \\ \text{his}_{i,} \end{array} \right.$

We returned his money to him.

- b. Við skiluðum honum_i heim til $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} sín_{i,} \\ ?\text{hans}_{i,} \end{array} \right.$
 we returned him_i home to $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} REFL_{i,} \\ ?\text{him}_{i,} \end{array} \right.$

We returned him to his home.

In (16a), the first object is optional, whereas in (16b) it is obligatory.

I have now speculated a little on some possible reasons for the differing acceptability of object-controlled reflexivization with different verbs, which cannot immediately be attributed to predication. Let me now mention some factors affecting the acceptability of object-controlled reflexivization which obviously have nothing to do with predication.

Maling quite correctly notes (this volume, note 7) that many speakers who do not accept reflexivization in (10) (= Maling's (1a)) are willing to accept it if *ég* 'I' is the subject. It seems clear that this difference cannot be due to predication. The most obvious reason for the difference is that if *ég* is the subject, no ambiguity can arise as to the referent of the reflexive.

Maling also notes that if *honum* 'him' (DAT) replaces *Haraldi* as an indirect object in sentences like (10), the reflexive is preferred in the direct object. This seems to be a general case; if there is a slight possibility of a reflexive referring to a proper name or any noun in object position, the reflexive becomes preferred if the former object is replaced by a personal pronoun. Let's look at the contrast between (17a) (= Maling's (6a)) and (17b):

- (17) a. Ég barði Siggu_i með dúkkunni $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *sinni_{i,} \\ \text{hennar}_{i,} \end{array} \right.$
 I hit with doll the $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *REFL_{i,} \\ \text{her}_{i,} \end{array} \right.$

I hit Sigga with her doll.

- (17) b. Ég barði hana_i með dúkkunni_i $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{sinni}_i. \\ ??\text{hennar}_i. \end{array} \right.$
I hit her_i with the doll $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{REFL}_i \\ ??\text{her}_i \end{array} \right.$

I hit her with her doll.

Many speakers who don't accept the reflexive in (17a), where the object is the proper noun **Siggu**, even find the nonreflexive marginal in (17b).

Maling's example (6b), repeated here as (18), is a special case, where very few, if any, will accept reflexivization:

- (18) Við töluðum við Jón_i um vandamál $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *\text{sín}_i \\ \text{hans}_i. \end{array} \right.$
we talked to about problems $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *\text{REFL}_i \\ \text{his}_i \end{array} \right.$

We talked to John about his problems.

Jón is not an object in this sentence, but is governed by the preposition **við**, and hence does not c-command the intended reflexive. In general, c-command seems to be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for reflexivization in Modern Icelandic, although it apparently was not so in Old Icelandic (cf. Nygaard 1905, p. 339).⁴ It is true, however, that Maling (1982, p. 96; cf. also 1984) mentions one counterexample to the c-command condition (i.e., (8) above); but that has to do with non-clause-bounded reflexivization, and there is reason to believe (as Maling herself argues) that NCBR obeys different conditions. Thus, I can see no reason for giving up the claim that c-command is a necessary condition for clause-bounded reflexivization.

I think it should be evident by now that many other factors than predication seem to play a role in determining the acceptability of object-controlled reflexivization.

3. REFLEXIVIZATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF INFINITIVES

Now let's turn to Maling's arguments against reflexivization as evidence for a clausal analysis of infinitives. Her arguments are based mainly on reflexivization possibilities in various kinds of **sem**-phrases, which she argues cannot plausibly be derived from full clauses. She argues that "since there are phrasal complements which cannot plausibly be derived from full clauses but which nonetheless exhibit the same pattern of reflexives as infinitival complements, the reflexive facts alone cannot be taken to justify a clausal analysis of infinitives". However, the (underlying) syntactic status of these **sem**-phrases is not very clear. In some cases at least, they might

be analyzed as a constituent not of VP, but of S; and in that case, no c-command relation will obtain between them and the object.

Contrary to what Maling claims, it is, in some cases at least, possible to provide a clausal source for the **sem**-phrases. Consider (19) (= Maling's (10a):

- (19) Vigdís heiðraði þá_i [_S sem forseti $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *sinn_i \\ þeirra_i \end{array} \right\}$].
*honored them_i [_S as president $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *REFL_i \\ their_i \end{array} \right\}$]*

Vigdís honored them as their president.

It is possible to derive this sentence from an underlying structure like (20), where both the understood subject and the copula are realized in surface structure:

- (20) Vigdís heiðraði þá [_S sem hún væri forseti þeirra].
honored them [_S as she were president their]

Vigdís honored them as if she were their president.

Example (20) is a possible Icelandic sentence, although the subjunctive **væri** would perhaps seem to indicate that Vigdís is not in fact a president; she just acted as if she were. But note that if **sem** is used in this sense it demands the subjunctive — the indicative is impossible in (20). Maybe that is the reason why deletion of **hún væri** is preferred — then we get rid of this feeling of unreality which the subjunctive carries with it.

Note that such deletions must be assumed in Icelandic for independent reasons; Subject-deletion under Identity applies e.g. in Equi-sentences (like Maling's (11a–b); cf. Thráinsson (1979, chapter 5)) and also in Conjunction Reduction (Rögnvaldsson 1982b); and deletion of **vera** takes place in Raising-sentences (like Maling's (2b); cf. Thráinsson (1979, chapter 6)). A deletion of both the subject and **vera** in the same sentence must also be assumed in the latter of two sentences conjoined with **enda** (which is a coordinate conjunction, corresponding in meaning roughly to 'because'). See Sigurðsson (1983) for an analysis of **enda**-sentences, and arguments for deletion.

The third possibility is to assume a deep structure like (21) for (19):

- (21) Vigdís [_S sem forseti þeirra] heiðraði þá.
[_S as president their] honored them

Vigdís honored them as their president.

This is a possible surface structure, although (19) sounds more natural; but if the subject is **ég** 'I', (21) sounds perfect. We would then have to assume that the **sem**-phrase is usually moved to the right; the possibility of

such movement will have to be open, of course, in sentences where **sem** is a relative particle (or complementizer; cf. Thráinsson (1979, chapter 4)).

I leave open the question of whether the **sem**-phrase in (21) should be derived from a clausal source. It is easy to provide such a source:

- (22) Vigdís [_s sem er forseti þeirra] heiðraði þá.
 [_s who is president their] honored them

Vigdís who is their president honored them.

As Friðjónsson (1980, p. 114n.) mentions, it is possible that some **sem**-phrases are base-generated as such, whereas others are derived from full clauses. **Sem** would then have two different functions, and could perhaps be compared to the status that some linguists have attributed to the English *than* (Hankamer (1973)). In any case it is clear that if the **sem**-phrase originates in subject position, the object does not c-command it, so that reflexivization will be impossible.

Let us look finally at (23) (= Maling's (9b)). In this sentence, reflexivization is impossible, even for those who otherwise accept object-controlled reflexivization. Maling claims this to be due to the fact that the required predication relation does not hold between **Haraldi** and **sem versti óvinur hans/sinn**:


- (23) Ég kem Haraldi_i fyrir sjónir sem versti óvinur $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *sinn_i. \\ hans_i. \end{array} \right.$
 I come DAT before eyes as worst enemy $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} *REFL_i \\ his_i \end{array} \right.$

I strike Harold as his worst enemy.

I think that it might be possible to analyze **Haraldi**, contrary to Maling's analysis, not as an object of the verb **koma** 'come', but as governed by the noun **sjónir** (PL) 'eyes'. In Old Icelandic, the dative could be used in such constructions to mark inalienable possession (Juntune 1978, p. 419);⁵ and this usage survives in the modern language in a few 'frozen' or metaphorical phrases. Example (23) certainly involves such a phrase (the word **sjónir** is almost exclusively used in this construction). In some of these phrases, the dative always precedes the PP; in other cases it follows the PP; and some cases can be found where the dative can either precede or follow the PP.⁶

There are two main reasons for believing that the dative is not an object of the verb in such constructions: (1) the head nouns in these constructions belong to a semantically restricted class, and the constructions usually have idiomatic meaning; and (2) the dative does not seem to be dependent on the verb, i.e. it also goes with verbs which do not normally take dative objects. The relevant underlying structure of (23) would then

be something like (24), where **Haraldi** obviously does not c-command the intended reflexive:



For this analysis to go through, we would have to assume some kind of local or minor movement, moving **Haraldi** to the left of the PP and resulting in the surface structure (23). As I said above, the dative can either precede or follow the PP in some of these constructions, so that some such movement must presumably be assumed in Icelandic anyway, but space does not allow me to go into arguments for movement in this example. However, I think that taken together, these things suffice to show that more research is needed before any conclusions can be drawn from (23).

In this section, I have pointed out a number of viable alternatives to Maling's analysis of *sem*-phrases. Although I have not reached any firm conclusions, I think it is clear that without more investigation the behavior of *sem*-phrases cannot be used to deprive Thráinsson's (1979) arguments for the clausal analysis of infinitives of their value.⁷

4. CONCLUSION

It has not been my aim in these comments to present any theory of Icelandic reflexivization. It seems clear that a complex interplay of syntactic, semantic and perhaps functional factors is involved — which means, of course, that any theory that tries to explain all the properties of reflexivization by reference to only one of these factors is bound to fail. But that does not mean that the theory is useless; it can certainly contribute to our knowledge of the problem, and contribute to any future complete description and explanation of Icelandic reflexivization.

NOTES

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¹ Maling (1984) states that "all Icelandic speakers ... distinguish between adverbial clauses and clauses embedded in argument positions insofar as intervening subjects are possible antecedents." Furthermore, she says that "It seems that the basically logophoric role of NCBR has become syntacticized for embedded clauses within argument positions

of the matrix verb." But as I stated above, I think that most speakers will feel a difference between verbs which are possible lexical governors (like *vonu*) and those which are not (like *vita*) — even though they will perhaps accept the subject of factive verbs like *vita* as antecedents. This, of course, constitutes no counterexample to Maling's theory of the "logophoric use" of reflexive pronouns, but rather supports it.

² On similar contrasts, see also Thráinsson (1976) and especially Árnason (1981).

³ Note that although Anderson cites the behavior of Icelandic reciprocals in favor of his theory, this behavior only constitutes an argument for having two types of reflexive. It can thus just as easily be accommodated with Maling's (1982 and 1984) distinction between clause-bounded and non-clause-bounded reflexives as with Anderson's distinction between anaphors and reflexive pronouns.

⁴ Note, however, that Nygaard claims that in Old Icelandic, reflexive pronouns only rarely refer to other nouns than subjects or objects (1905, p. 339).

⁵ Speaking about reflexivization in Old Icelandic, Juntune (1978, p. 419) says: "There is little difference in function between reflexive pronouns and reflexive possessives, indeed, since a dative pronoun is normally used rather than a possessive to indicate inalienable possession, they are at times interchangeable . . ."

⁶ An example of the second type is *skerða hár á höfði einhverjum* 'cut hair on head somebody (DAT)' (lit. 'cut hair on somebody's head'), i.e. 'do somebody harm'. An example of the third type is *sjá einhverjum á bak/sjá á bak einhverjum* 'see (look) on somebody (DAT) back/see (look) on back somebody (DAT)' (lit. 'see somebody's back'), i.e. 'lose somebody'.

⁷ It may be added that some speakers (especially the younger ones) find the reflexive normal in (i), whereas others find it quite bad:

- (i) Hann_i er eins og pabbi sinn_i.
 He_i is as father REFL_i.
 He is like his father.

As Höskuldur Thráinsson has pointed out to me, this might be interpreted as indicating an ongoing change in the (underlying) status of comparative clauses from sentential to phrasal.

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